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ABSTRACT

Investigations of moral development have usually relied on longitudinal research on adolescent males; such research has served as a basis for national educational efforts to foster moral development. To represent female as well as male perspectives in constructing theories of human development, conceptions of morality and conceptions of self and the relationship between them were investigated in a cross sectional sample of 36 individuals, evenly divided by sex, at each of nine ages, and matched for education and social class. From interview data, coding manuals were developed that identify and describe two different conceptions of morality (justice and caring) and two different conceptions of self in relation to others (separate and connected). The manuals were used to test the hypotheses that: morality as justice is predominately male and morality as caring is predominately female; a conception of self as separate is predominately male and a conception of self as connected is predominately female; those whose conception of moraltiy is justice will have a conception of self as separate and those whose conception of morality is caring will have a conception of self as connected. All three hypotheses were confirmed. These results provide a basis for an expanded theory of moral development that represents the perspectives of both males and females and offers schools a new way to think about moral development in education. (MCF)

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THOUGHT TO DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY:

The Elimination of Sex Bias in Moral Development Research and Education

Final Report Submitted to: National Institute of Education

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to represent female as well as male perspectives in constructing psychological theories of human development. The specific area of investigation was moral development, where longitudinal research on adolescent males has served as the basis for a variety of nation-wide efforts to foster moral development through education. Conceptions of morality and conceptions of self and the relationship between them were investigated in a cross-sectional sample of males and females across the life cycle, divided by sex and matched for age, education and social class. Through the inclusion of females in theory-building research and the construction of reliable coding manuals, it has been demonstrated that in addition to the conception of morality as justice identified in previous longitudinal research on males, there exists a conception of morality as care. It has been further demonstrated that people's conceptions of themselves include two primary modes of self-definition--two distinct modes of defining the self in relation to others--separate and connected. The coding manuals that identify and describe these different conceptions of self and morality were used to test three hypotheses: (1) that in situations of moral conflict and choice, the conception of morality as justice would be more prevalent in the thinking of males and the conception of morality as care would be more prevalent in the thinking of females; (2) that in people's descriptions of themselves, the conception of self as separate would be found predominantly in males and the conception of self as connected predominantly in females; and (3) that individuals with a primary conception of morality as justice would also have a primary conception of self as separate, while individuals with a primary conception of morality as care would have a primary conception of self as connected. All three hypotheses were confirmed.

The results show: (1) that these different conceptions of self and morality exist in individuals across the life cycle; and (2) that they are significantly related to gender, but not absolutely confined to gender. These results provide the empirical basis for an expanded theory of moral development that is equitable in its representation of the perspectives of both males and females. In so doing, this work: (1) takes a significant step toward the correction of systematic sex bias in previous moral development research based on all-male samples; and (2) provides a new framework for rethinking issues of justice and care, separation and connection, in the lives of both men and women across the life cycle. Thus this work offers to schools a new way to think about moral development in education and to address issues of morality that are of central concern to the schools.

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I. OVERVIEW

Through the inclusion of females in moral development research, this project has provided the empirical basis for an expanded theory of moral development that is equitable in its representation of the perspectives of both males and females. In so doing, it takes a significant step toward the correction of systematic sex bias in previous moral development theory which has been derived from research on males. Through the identification of two different conceptions of self and morality that were found to be significantly related but not absolutely confined to gender, this research thus provides a new framework, that can serve as the basis for efforts to foster moral development through education and to address issues of morality that are of central concern to the schools.

Prior research by the principal investigator for this project (Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982) suggested that the consideration of women's thinking points to two different "orientations" to morality--two different ways of organizing and understanding the moral domain--one centered on issues of care and the other on justice and rights. The focus on justice and rights has characterized the dominant theories of moral development based on research on the moral judgment of males (e.g., Kohlberg, 1958, 1969, 1971). Gilligan's work also suggested that the different conceptions of morality which these orientations represent--respectively, care and justice--were related to different conceptions of self. However, a confounding of the variables of age, social class, sex and type of dilemma in previous research precluded a direct investigation of these differences. Therefore, this project undertook the task of systematically exploring the domain of morality in a cross-sectional sample of males and females, equally divided by sex and matched for age, educational experience, and social class.

That task has been completed, and two different conceptions of self and morality were found in these data. Reliable coding manuals that identify and describe two different conceptions of morality and two different conceptions of self have been constructed (see Lyons, 1981a; 1981b), and the coding of data has been completed. Specifically, this research has demonstrated, in empirical data:

1. That there is a distinct conception of morality as care which can be systematically identified and reliably coded;
2. That the conception of morality as care can be systematically and reliably distinguished from the conception of morality as justice identified in previous research;
3. That the different conceptions of morality can be identified in real-life moral dilemmas (i.e., in people's descriptions of their actual experiences or moral conflict and choice);
4. That a definition of self in relation to others is a central component of people's self-concept;

5. That there are two different conceptions of self that can be systematically identified and reliably coded;
6. That these two different conceptions of self can be identified in people's descriptions of themselves;
7. That these two different conceptions of self are differentially related to the two different conceptions of morality;
8. That these two different conceptions of self and two different conceptions of morality are related to the different ways people think about moral choice; and
9. That these different conceptions of self and morality are significantly related but not absolutely confined to gender.

The Interim Report of this research project (Langdale & Gilligan, 1980), submitted at the end of the first year, included the background and rationale for this research, an extensive review of the literature, and the descriptive analysis of the data which empirically confirmed that there are two different conceptions of self and two different conceptions of morality and that they are related to gender. This report, which covers the second year of the project, includes a description of the coding manuals which have been constructed and which consistently and reliably identify these different conceptions of self and morality in empirical data, the results of the statistical analysis of the data using these coding manuals, and a discussion of the significance and implication of this work for psychological research and for education. Together with the interim report, this document constitutes the final report for the project.

II. THE EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION OF TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF MORALITY

A. Project Expansion

The empirical finding of two different conceptions of self and two different conceptions of morality in the data extended the work of this project far beyond that originally proposed. First, in contrast to the original proposal to construct a single coding scheme, it was necessary to construct reliable coding schemes for both conceptions of self and both conceptions of morality in order to integrate and accommodate these empirical findings.

Second, additional data were collected. Only the interview format for the real-life dilemmas (in contrast to the hypothetical dilemmas) generated data from which general categories required could be consistently derived and applied to allow a systematic and scientifically valid identification and comparison of the two orientations. Thus only that portion of the sample containing real-life dilemma data (the 36 "intensive" cases out of the total of 144 cases) proved to be adequate for manual construction and data analysis. (See Interim Report, p. 38.) The re-assessment of those 36 intensive cases to insure that this smaller sample met the highest standards in terms of the adequacy of the data[1] led to the collection of additional data.

Interviews with new subjects were conducted and transcribed for two males and two females in the 15-year-old group and two females in the 19-year-old group. In addition, two interviews--one with an 8-year-old male and one with an 8-year-old female--were conducted to replace the two six-year-olds in the original sample. The interviews with the 8-year-olds not only generated richer data[2], but also made the number of subjects in each age cell equal. (The original sample contained only two subjects in the age 8 cell.)

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[1]Cases were judged on the basis of whether all of the sections of the interview and the standard questions were included as well as whether responses were adequately probed by the interviewer. The decision to construct the manuals on the basis of the real-life dilemma data was not, however, solely a pragmatic one. See p. 20ff. for a discussion of the significance of the demonstration in this work that real-life dilemma data can be used in moral development research and of the implications of this demonstration for future research. Eight of the 36 interviews did not meet the standard deemed necessary in order to justify the use of a smaller sample.

[2]The techniques for interviewing younger children as well as the development of a more flexible methodology that would elicit conceptions of self and morality which may serve the same adaptive function throughout the life cycle but may appear differently in data from young children is being explored as an outgrowth of this project.

B. The Sample

The final sample used for the construction of the coding schemes and data analysis consisted of individuals matched on all characteristics except gender. To isolate the variable of gender while maximizing the potential for development, subjects ranging in age from eight to sixty-plus years were of high socio-economic and professional status (Hollingshead, 1965), factors found in previous research (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1980) to be associated with moral development. The cross-sectional sample consisted of thirty-six individuals, evenly divided by sex, at each of nine ages (see Table 1).[3]

Table 1

SAMPLE FOR MANUAL CONSTRUCTION AND DATA ANALYSIS

	Age								
Sex	8	12	15	19	22	27	36	46	60+
Females (N=18)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Males (N=18)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

Data for the remaining 108 individuals of similar ages and SES who were not as intensively interviewed were used as a data resource in the process of clarifying the concepts delineated in the manuals.

The rationale for choosing this sample included several additional considerations. The first was the concern to have professional women in the study. In response to evidence that males tend to score higher than females in his developmental measure of the concept of morality as justice, Kohlberg has hypothesized that when women were engaged professionally outside the home they would be found to have more advanced conceptions of justice than the typical "women's" stage (three) of his system (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Stated another way, the study was planned with a professional sample to test Gilligan's hypothesis that a morality of care would be more consistently found within females, even if they were highly educated and professional women. (See Appendix A.) A second consideration in sample selection was that it seems to make sense to have a very intelligent and articulate group of individuals, more likely to be found in a highly educated sample, who might help to elaborate the conception of morality as care and the conception of self as connected which had been suggested by Gilligan's

[3]Fifty percent of the sample was used in constructing the manual for coding self-descriptions and 33% of the sample was used in constructing the manual for coding real-life dilemmas.

work. Finally, both males and females were included not only to avoid the trap of bias of single-sex samples, but also to explore within males and females different conceptions of self and morality across the life cycle. If the absence of females in theory-building research in the past had obscured an understanding of the morality of care and the conception of self as connected, the inclusion of both males and females within this study might reveal the complexity of these conceptions in relationship to gender, to age, and to each other.

Because the coding schemes constructed through this work rest on limited data, given the size and composition of the sample, the significance of this work lies not in the findings that may reflect characteristics unique to this sample, but rather in the empirical verification of the distinctions between two different conceptions of morality and two different conceptions of self. Small sample size is, however, characteristic of theory-building research in the field of moral development. Piaget's work which laid the foundation for the field centered on a study of 20 boys; there are 58 males in Kohlberg's longitudinal sample. The patterns showing the representation of the two different conceptions of self and the two different conceptions of morality in relation to both age and gender identified in the current sample await verification in larger and more broadly selected samples. This work, then is first an invitation to others to join in the verification of the findings described in this report.

C. The Data

The data of the intensive sample consisted of responses of individuals to a five-part interview which included:

1. A general introductory question (taken from Perry, 1968), "Looking back over the past year/five years what stands out for you?"
2. Hypothetical moral dilemmas--the Heinz dilemma (one of Kohlberg's justice dilemmas) and, a hypothetical "responsibility" or caring dilemma.
3. A real-life dilemma generated by the individual in response to a question about a personal experience of moral conflict and choice. The initial question was asked in several ways--Have you ever been in a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do? or, Have you ever had a moral conflict, or could you describe a moral conflict?--and was followed by a series of standard probe questions: Could you describe the situation? What were the conflicts for you? What did you do? Did you think it was the right thing to do? How did you know it was the right thing to do?
4. Self-description data--response to the questions: How would you describe yourself to yourself? Is the way you describe yourself now different from the way you saw yourself in the past? If you see change, how would you account for that?

5. General questions asked within the interview: What does morality mean to you? What makes something a moral problem for you? What does responsibility mean to you? When responsibility to self and others conflict, how should one choose?

The interview was conducted as in an open-ended manner, following the method of the clinical interrogatory first elaborated by Piaget. The real-life dilemma data was the primary source for the construction of the coding schemes for conception of morality; the self-description data was the primary source for the construction of the coding schemes for conception of self.

D. Description of the Coding Schemes

The scheme for coding real-life dilemmas focuses on the considerations which individuals, when describing their own experience of moral conflicts, brought to mind in (1) telling what became a moral conflict for them; (2) describing how they resolved or are resolving it; and (3) talking about how they evaluated or are evaluating the resolution. The scheme delineates two kinds of considerations which concern individuals in moral choice: (1) Considerations of Response representing a morality of care, and (2) Considerations of Rights representing a morality of justice. Table 2 provides an outline of the coding scheme for conceptions of morality.

Table 2 here

The scheme for coding the "Describe Yourself" question represents the characteristic ways in which people describe themselves. The scheme delineates two modes of self-definition based on the contrast between the definition of self as connected in relation to others and as separate/objective in relation to others. (See Relational component (#4) on Table 3.)

Table 3 here

E. Intercoder Reliability

Intercoder reliability was established independently by a second and third coder in a two-step procedure in the coding of both the real-life dilemma data and the self-description data. For the real-life dilemma data, at Step 1, agreement was determined for identifying the unit of analysis in the scheme for coding real-life dilemmas--i.e.,

Table 2

MORALITY AS CARE AND MORALITY AS JUSTICE: A SCHEME FOR CODING CONSIDERATIONS OF RESPONSE AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RIGHTS

A. The Construction of the Problem

Considerations of Response (Care)

1. General effects to others (unelaborated);
2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships; or response to another considering interdependence;
3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict; or, the alleviation of another's burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological);
4. Considers the "situation vs./over the principle";
5. Considers care of self; care of self vs. care of others.

Considerations of Rights (Justice)

1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including "trouble" "how decide");
2. Obligations, duty or commitments;
3. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness, that is, how one would like to be treated if in other's place;
4. Considers the "principle vs./over the situation";
5. Considers that others have their own contexts;

B. The Resolution of the Problem/Conflict

Considerations of Response (Care)

1. General effects to others (unelaborated);
2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships; or response to another considering interdependence;
3. Welfare/well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict; or, the alleviation of another's burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological);
4. Considers the "situation vs. the principle";
5. Considers care of self; care of self vs./care of others;

Considerations of Rights (Justice)

1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including "trouble" "decision");
2. Obligations, duty or commitments;
3. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness, that is, how one would like to be treated if in other's place;
4. Considers the "principle vs./over the situation";
5. Considers that others have their own contexts.

C. The Evaluation of the Resolution

Considerations of Response (Care)

1. What happened/how worked out;
2. Whether relationships maintained/restored;

Considerations of Rights (Justice)

1. How decided/thought about/justified;
2. Whether values/standards/principles maintained.

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Table 3

A SCHEME FOR CODING RESPONSES TO THE "DESCRIBE YOURSELF" QUESTION

1. General and Factual
   1. General factual
   2. Physical characteristics
   3. Identifying activities
   4. Identifying possessions
   5. Social status

2. Abilities and Agency
   1. General ability
   2. Agency
   3. Physical abilities
   4. Intellectual abilities

3. Psychological
   1. Interests (likes/dislikes)
   2. Traits/dispositions
   3. Beliefs, values
   4. Pre-occupations

4. Relational Component
   A. Connected in relation to others:
      1. Have relationships: (relationships are there)
      2. Abilities in relationships: (make, sustain; to care, to do things for others)
      3. Traits/dispositions in relationships: (help others)
      4. Concern: for the good of another in their terms
      5. Pre-occupations: with doing good for another; with how to do good
   B. Separate/objective in relation to others
      1. Have relationships: (relationships part of obligations/commitments; instrumental)
      2. Abilities in relationships: (skill in interacting with others)
      3. Traits/dispositions in relationships: (act in reciprocity; live up to duty/obligation; commitment; fairness)
      4. Concern: for others in light of principles, values, beliefs or general good of society)
      5. Pre-occupations: with doing good for society; with whether to do good for others)

Summary statements
Self-evaluating Commentary
  1. In self's terms
  2. In self in relation to others
     a. Connected self
     b. Separate self

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each consideration within the real-life dilemma data. Then agreement was determined for categorizing considerations as those of "Response" or "Rights" within the "Construction," the "Resolution," and the "Evaluation" of moral choice/conflict (Step 2). The percent of agreement between coders is shown in Table 4.

Table 4

INTERCODER RELIABILITY FOR CODING REAL-LIFE DILEMMAS

Coders	Percentage of Agreement	
	Step 1: Identifying Considerations	Step 2: Categorizing Considerations
A&B	75%	84%
B&C	76%	78%

Similarly in the coding of the self-description data at Step 1, agreement was determined for identifying each characterization of the self within the response to the Describe Yourself question. Then agreement was determined for categorizing self-characterizations including relational characterizations within the "separate/objective" or "connected" categories (Step 2). The percent of agreement between coders is shown in Table 5.

Table 5

INTERCODER RELIABILITY FOR CODING SELF-DESCRIPTIONS

Coders	Percentage of Agreement	
	Step 1: Identifying Characterizations	Step 2: Categorizing Characterizations
A&B	71%	74%
C&D	71%	82%

It should be noted that this two-step procedure for assessing reliability on the identification of the unit of analysis as well as on the categorization of data is more rigorous than most correlational reliability procedures generally used with interview data such as that collected for this study. In the coding of the self-description data, for example, the first step of this process demands that coders agree on the identification of the specific statement of a subject's to be coded as a characterization of the self. This means that the percentage of agreement reached at Step 1 represents a one-to-one

correspondence of judgment by two independent coders with the exact words of an individual. In more traditional correlational methods, agreement usually means coders' agreement on the subject's relative standing on test scores, frequency of a particular behavior, or amount of a particular attribute. The methodological strictness of the system used here is most reflective of the research method employed in obtaining these data and, we believe, important to the theory/data dialogue seen as central to this research. In the self-description data, data are the person's attributions of meaning about the self. The standards of reliability adopted for this work demand that coders agree on the meaning they make of what a subject says. Finally, it should be noted that the coding process for the self-description data accounts for all the statements made by an individual in response to the question, "How would you describe yourself to yourself?"

F. Data Analysis and Manual Construction: A Dialogue Between Theory and Data

In the process of data analysis and the construction of a reliable and valid coding scheme, theory and data are intricately linked in a pattern of constant interaction. Throughout the course of this research, the choice of categories and coding decisions have been both theoretically and empirically based. Since it is through this theory/data dialogue that it has been possible for the first time to (1) identify the conception of morality as care and distinguish it from the conception of morality as justice represented in existing theory; and (2) identify two different conceptions of self, we draw on some examples from this work to illuminate that dialogue as it was carried on in the construction of the coding manuals.

In the very first version of the coding scheme for conception of morality, the categories of "Considerations of Rights" and "Considerations of Response" were applied only to considerations found in the "resolution" of conflict presented by a subject. In part, this approach reflected the focus in previous research and existing theory on how individuals make judgments of what one should do to resolve moral conflicts in situations of moral choice. But as coding began, one of the coders noticed that some considerations were really not of the "Resolution" but rather seemed to describe the "problem." It was at this point that the coding distinction between considerations in the "Construction of the Problem" and the "Resolution" were developed. But this distinction was possible because theoretically it made sense. We had already observed that individuals with an orientation to "Response" constructed problems differently, that is, what became a moral problem for individuals with an orientation to "Response" stemmed from a different way of seeing others and attending to their concerns and needs. It made sense theoretically to try to make the distinction between the "problem" and the "resolution" in moral choice. Theory then dictated the coding of data.

Similarly, a different example reveals how data influences manual development and gives direction to theory. One theoretical point that always seemed clear was that within an orientation to "Response" there seemed to be a perspective towards others that was different from what the psychological literature usually described as perspective-taking. What seemed different was how it worked. Rather than trying to see another's situation as if one were in it oneself, a perspective of "Response" saw others in their own terms, not--so to speak--filtered through the self's perspective-taking, but trying instead to step into the situation of the other and know or experience it as the other did. In the process of manual construction, after the distinction between the considerations in the construction, resolution and evaluation of choice had been clarified, an attempt was made to try to code what was called a "Perspective Towards Others" for both orientations. But the effort was abortive. While some "considerations" could be coded this way, most could not without being coded twice, that is, coded within the regular categories for considerations of "Response" or "Rights." Coding the same item in two different categories is "verboten," a violation of a cardinal rule of coding designed to insure independent observations within the coding process. But the point of all this is that while this procedure did not work, it did not for a very good reason. What became clear through this experience was that each orientation carried a perspective towards others embedded within it, within the categories of each orientation. The perspective could not be isolated, since it was a part of the considerations of the coding scheme. This experience helped to clarify a major point in the conceptualization of the coding scheme, that is, identifying the "perspective towards others" as the distinguishing characteristic of an understanding of relationships. The effectiveness of this method of data analysis and manual construction, which was used throughout the course of this research, demonstrates its merit as a guide for future research, particularly research aimed at the inclusion of groups left out of existing theory.

III. RESULTS

The coding manuals that identify and describe two different conceptions of self and morality were used to test three hypotheses:

1. That in situations of moral conflict and choice, the conception of morality as justice would be more predominant in males and the conception of morality as care would be more predominant in females;
2. That in people's descriptions of themselves, the conception of self as separate would be more predominant in males and the conception of self as connected more predominant in females; and
3. That individuals with a predominant conception of morality as justice would also have a predominant conception of self as separate, while individuals with a predominant conception of morality as care would have a predominant conception of self as connected.

All three hypotheses were confirmed.

A. The Relationship Between Two Different Conceptions of Morality and Gender

The predominance of the conception of morality as care or justice was determined through the identification of the considerations individuals presented in the construction, resolution and evaluation of moral conflict in the real-life dilemma data. These considerations were then categorized as either considerations of "Response" indicating a conception of morality as care or considerations of "Rights" indicating a conception of morality as justice (See Table 2). A "score" was determined indicating the frequency of either mode (i.e., justice or care) within an individual's dilemma by counting the number of considerations of "Response" and the number of considerations of "Rights." Predominance is simply that mode in which the greatest number of considerations are categorized. A ratio of this frequency may be presented as a percentage indicating the relationship of dominant mode to all considerations an individual makes. For example: Response 1 / Rights: 5 can be changed to show 5 out of 6 considerations, or 83%, rights considerations predominating. Confirmation of hypothesis 1 above, showing the predicted relationships between gender and the two different conceptions of morality as marked by considerations of response or considerations of rights is presented in Table 6.

Table 6

PREDOMINANCE OF RESPONSE OR RIGHTS' CONSIDERATIONS:
FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	Response %(N)	Rights %(N)	Res/Rgts. %(N)
Females N=16	75%(12)	25%(4)	0%(0)
Males N=14	14%(2)	79%(11)	7%(1)

Note: $x^2(2) = 11.63$ $p < .001$
--From Lyons, 1981a.

Table 6 shows that in real-life moral conflict 75% (or 12) of the females in this sample chose considerations of "Response" and 79% (or 11) of the males chose considerations of "Rights" predominantly when dealing with real-life moral conflict. Table 6 also shows that 25% (or 4) of the females chose considerations of "Rights" and 14% (or 2) of the males chose considerations of "Response" for their predominant considerations in real-life moral choice. This means that while females more frequently use considerations of "Response" and males more frequently use considerations of "Rights" in real-life conflict, some females predominate with considerations of "Rights" and some males predominate with considerations of "Response." Thus the results summarized in Table 6 show that in real-life moral conflict individuals call upon and think about considerations predominantly within one mode which is related to, but not defined by, a person's gender; i.e., in this sample, considerations in real moral choice are significantly related to gender, but not gender determined. Table 6 shows that, in this sample, not one female failed to present a consideration of "Response" and, similarly, not one male failed to present a consideration of "Rights." Table 7 indicates the hypothesized relationship between gender and conception of morality in another way. Table 7 shows that, in this sample, 37% (6) of the females did not mention one consideration of "Rights," and, similarly, 36% (6) of the males did not mention one consideration of "Response."

Table 7

ABSENCE OF RESPONSE OR RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS:
FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	No Response Considerations %(N)	No Rights Considerations %(N)
Females N=6	0%(0)	37%(6)
Males N=6	36%(6)	0%(0)

--From Lyons, 1981a.

Further, in this sample, this relationship exists across the life cycle. Table 8 reveals predominance in the use of considerations of rights and considerations of response for the individuals of this sample at childhood, adolescence and adulthood.

Table 8

PATTERNS OF PREDOMINANCE OF RIGHTS OR RESPONSE CONSIDERATIONS ACROSS THE LIFE-CYCLE: FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	Predominant Considerations	Childhood (8-11) N	%	Adolescence (15-22) N	%	Adulthood (27-60) N	%
Females N=16	Response:	2	13%	6	37%	4	25%
	Rights:	1	6%	0	0%	3	19%
	Res./Rgts:	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Males N=14	Response:	0	0%	1	7%	1	7%
	Rights:	3	21.5%	3	21.5%	5	36%
	Res./Rgts:	0	0%	1	7%	0	0%

--From Lyons, 1981a.

While this project did not systematically consider the issue of development across the life cycle, some results of this study point to potential developmental issues. Considerations of "Response" like

considerations of "Rights" are found across the life cycle indicating that both are systematic life cycle concerns. Tables 9 and 10 indicate some developmental trends that will bear further study:

Tables 9 and 10 here

Tables 9 and 10 indicate the interesting fact that in adulthood (after age 27 in this sample) the women construct "problems" of moral conflict considering issues of rights at a frequency not found before. While it is equally interesting that these women continue to call upon considerations of "Response" more frequently than "Rights" in the resolution of these conflicts, it is important to note this emergence of considerations of "Rights" within the adult women in this sample. This fact fits with another finding: that the consideration "care of the self"--one of the considerations within the "Response" orientation (see Table 2)--drops out of this sample also after age 27. This means that for this sample "care of the self" as a consideration in moral choice disappears at a time when considerations of "Rights" (obligations, principles, values) dramatically increase in women's considerations. This finding suggests a potential developmental shift for women. It may especially suggest that an orientation of "Rights" may somehow interact with an orientation of "Response" at this time in the life cycle and at this time in history.

Table 9 also indicates that within this sample considerations of "Response" are more frequently called upon at adolescence for males. But, at least in this sample, men seem to maintain a greater consistency with the use of considerations of "Rights" across the life cycle.

B. The Relationship Between Two Different Conceptions of Self and Gender

The predominance of conception of self as separate/objective or conception of self as "connected" was determined through the identification of the characteristic ways of describing the self in responses of individuals to the "Describe Yourself" question. These characterizations were then categorized according to the coding scheme outlined in Table 3. A score was determined by counting the number of "connected" or "separate/objective" characterizations within the relational component of self-definition. Predominance of mode within this scoring system is that mode (i.e., separate or connected) in which the greatest number of characterizations are categorized. Confirmation of hypothesis 2, showing the predicted relationship between gender and these two different modes of self-definition, is presented in Table 11.

Table 9

DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS: PATTERNS IN THE FREQUENCY OF CONSIDERATIONS* OF RESPONSE OR RIGHTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND RESOLUTION OF MORAL CONFLICT: FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	Dilemma Part	Childhood		Adolescence		Adulthood		TOTALS	
		Res.	Rgts	Res.	Rgts	Res.	Rgts	Res.	Rgts
Females N=16	Construction of the problem:	8	2	8	0	11	14	27	16
	Resolution:	8	4	10	0	10	2	28	6
	Totals:	16	6	18	0	21	16	55	22
Males N=14	Construction of the problem:	2	7	7	6	4	14	13	27
	Resolution:	2	16	3	5	1	9	6	30
	Totals:	4	23	10	11	5	23	19	57

*Numbers are of considerations individuals present on two aspects of the dilemma; i.e., the construction of the problem and the resolution of the problem.
--From Lyons, 1981a.

Table 10

USE OF RESPONSE AND RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IN ADULT WOMEN

Adult Females (27+ years)	Considerations of Response	Considerations of Rights
N=7 In the Problem:	11 or 44%	14 or 56%
N=7 In the Resolution:	10 or 83%	2 or 17%

--From Lyons, 1981a.

Table 11

PREDOMINANCE OF CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AS SEPARATE OR CONNECTED: FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	Connected %(N)	Separate/Objective %(N)	Equally Conn/Sep. %(N)	Neither Conn/Sep. %(N)
Females (N=16)	63%(10)	12% (2)	6%(1)	19%(3)
Males (N=14)	0%(0)	79% (11)	7%(1)	14%(2)

Note: $x^2(3) = 16.3$ $p < .001$
--From Lyons, 1981b.

The results in Table 11 show that 63% (or 10) of the females of this sample use characteristics of the "connected" self and 79% (or 11) of the males use characteristics of the "separate/objective" self when responding to the question, "How would you describe yourself to yourself?" Table 11 also shows that 12% (or 2) of the females use characteristics of the "separate" self, no male defines himself solely as "connected," and one male and one female each define themselves with an equal number of characteristics of both "separate" and "connected" modes of self-definition. Thus modes of self-definition in this sample are significantly gender-related, but are not gender determined. Finally, Table 11 shows that 19% (or 3) of the females and 14% (or 2) of the males had no characterizations of the self as separate or connected.

Table 12 reveals that the relationship between gender and concept of self exists across the life cycle.

Table 12

MODES OF SELF-DEFINITION ACROSS THE LIFE CYCLE: FEMALES AND MALES

Sex	Childhood (8-12)			Adolescence (15-22)			Adulthood (27-60+)		
	Conn	Sep	Other*	Conn	Sep	Other	Conn	Sep	Other
Females (N=16)	2	0	1	5	0	1	3	2	2
Males (N=14)	0	3	0	0	4	1	0	4	2

*Equally separated and connected or no characterizations of the self as separate or connected.
--From Lyons, 1981b.

C. The Relationship Between Conceptions of Morality and Conceptions of Self

The relationship between the two different conceptions of morality and the two different conceptions of self was determined through a comparison of the score of predominance of considerations of either "rights" (justice) or "response" (care) from the analysis of the moral dilemma data and the score of predominance of characterizations of either "separate/objective" or "connected" from the analysis of the self-description data. The results of that analysis, which confirm the third hypothesis tested in this study, are shown in Table 13.

Table 13

MODES OF SELF-DEFINITION RELATED TO MODES OF MORAL CHOICE: RESPONSE OR RIGHTS

Predominant Modes of Moral Choice	Modes of Self-definition: Connected	Separate/ Objective	Other (S/C or None)*
Considerations of Response N=13 (12F; 1M)	10(10F)	0	3 (2F; 1M)
Considerations of Response N=16 (12M; 4F)	0	13 (11=M) (2=F)	3 (2F; 1M)

Note: $x^2(2) = 23.39$ $p < .001$

*"S/C" indicates individuals having an equal number of "separate/objective" and "connected" characterizations; "None" indicates an individual having no characterizations of the self as separate or connected.

--From Lyons, 1981b.

Table 10 reveals that, in constructing and resolving real-life moral conflicts, individuals--male or female--who define themselves as "connected" more frequently call upon the considerations of "response" which mark the conception of morality of care, and that individuals--male or female--who define themselves as "separate/objective" call upon the considerations of rights which mark the conception of morality as justice.

D. Summary

The significance of these findings lies in the empirical verification of two different modes of thinking about moral choice and two different modes of self-definition. The empirical confirmation of the existence of a morality of care indicates that people do not think about moral conflict and choice solely in terms of justice and rights. Considerations based on care concern individuals as much as considerations based on justice in situations individuals describe as posing moral conflicts for them. The empirical confirmation of the existence of characteristic ways of defining the self as separate and connected suggests that how one sees oneself in relation to others is central to how one defines and understands oneself. At the same time, the extent of the relatedness of these two different modes of moral choice and two different modes of self-definition clearly points to the fact that the way one thinks about the relationship between self and other affects the way one thinks about moral choice.

The finding that these different modes are found across the life cycle in this sample are confirming of the systemmatic nature of these two different conceptions of morality and two different conceptions of self. The variations in the presence, absence, and predominance of these different modes of moral choice and self-definition across the life cycle suggest a greater complexity in the dynamics of development than is currently represented by the focus on a single dimension of moral development (i.e., justice) which permeates the literature.

In this sample, there was a significant relationship between gender and both the two different modes of moral choice and two different modes of self-definition. The generality of this association is an empirical question.

In the larger sense, we can view the results of this study another way. The purpose of this project was to explore what the thinking of females, a group previously omitted from theory-building research samples, could contribute to developmental theory. Their contribution, through this work, has been the articulation of a conception of morality and self which has been missing in our accounts of the development of males as well.

Let us turn now to a closer examination of the specific implications of this work for future research.

V. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

The major accomplishments of this project are but a first step toward the goal of expanding moral development theory to include groups previously excluded from theory-building research. Yet the completion of this work points to specific areas where expansion and revision of research in the psychology of moral development is needed, thus providing a sense of direction for future research that will enable the continuation of progress toward that goal.

A. Construction of Coding Schemes that Accommodate Different Conceptions of Self and Morality

This project has constructed reliable coding manuals for two different conceptions of self and two different conceptions of morality. Evidence of the existence of these different conceptions of self and morality and the finding that both may be present in the thinking of any individual indicates a need for measures that can assess both. What this means in terms of constructing coding schemes is that they must be framed in terms of general categories that can be consistently applied to these different conceptions in order to enable the systematic analysis of data so there is a scientific basis for comparing the presence, absence, predominance, and development of these different conceptions. The manuals constructed in this work are a first effort to devise such measures. For example, the manuals for coding conception of morality utilize the general categories of the construction of the problem, the resolution, and the evaluation of the resolution. These categories meet the scientific requirement of theoretical relevance in that they represent the inherent structure of a conflict in human relationships. They also meet the requirements for exclusivity; i.e., the three categories are conceptually distinct--how one perceives a problem is conceptually different from how one resolves it, and both are conceptually distinct from how one evaluates that resolution. The face validity of these conceptual distinctions may be best exemplified when we consider them in the terms we hear in our daily lives: "What is the problem?" "What should I do about it?" "Am I doing the right thing?". But while these categories meet the standards for scientific inquiry and provide a workable framework for different conceptions of self and morality in the data for this project, clearly there is a need to test their usefulness in larger and different samples, and make whatever revisions appear necessary to account for additional empirical findings.

B. The Use of Real-Life Dilemmas

This research has demonstrated that it is possible to use real-life dilemmas in moral development research. There are both empirical

and theoretical grounds for focusing future research on real-life dilemmas. Empirically, evidence in the data that moral problems are constructed (as well as resolved and evaluated)[4] differently in a morality of justice and a morality of care indicates the need for a methodology that allows people to construct the moral problem themselves, rather than being presented with hypothetical dilemmas where the moral problem has been pre-constructed by the researcher.

One of the major arguments in the literature in support of the use of hypothetical dilemmas is the standardization of measure; i.e., the use of the same dilemma with all subjects provides a basis for comparing their understanding of morality. This research has shown, however, that a shift in focus to the standardization of questions which are posed in the interview format as questions that follow the subjects' self-generated real-life dilemma provides the necessary standardization for a comparison of their thinking. That is, it is possible to consistently apply the same categories to data and identify patterns in people's moral understanding across a wide variety of real-life dilemmas in both moral orientations by asking subjects to describe a situation in which they had to make a moral decision but weren't sure what was the right thing to do and then probing their thinking with the following standard questions: (1) What was the conflict for you in that situation?--i.e., the constructions of the problem; (2) In thinking about what to do, what did you consider--i.e., the resolution of the problem; and (3) Did you think that was the right decision? Why/why not? How did you know?--i.e., the evaluation of the resolution.

The importance of seeking standardization in the use of open-ended questions that are not specifically related to either justice or care was further empirically supported in this research in another way. It was found that even when subjects are presented with hypothetical dilemmas which both reflect the researcher's construction of the problem and are intended to be orientation-specific, some subjects reconstruct the problem in terms of the other orientation. (See Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Langdale & Gilligan, 1980). Reflecting the relationship between the construction of the problem and how it is resolved, the follow-up probe questions in the hypothetical dilemmas are also orientation-specific. If subjects construct the problem differently, a discrepancy exists between what the interviewer is asking and what the subject is answering which raises a question as to whether the hypothetical dilemmas actually provide

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[4]The significance of the relationship between the formulation of the problem and its answer is widely discussed in mathematics and philosophy, as well as in this work in psychology. (See, for example, Einstein, 1938; Langer, 1976; Blum, 1980). For an illustration of how the failure to recognize that relationship appears to have masked the existence of the responsibility orientation in moral development research, see Langdale, 1980.

a standardized measure. This phenomenon was found to exist in the hypothetical dilemma data for both the Heinz dilemma, which was constructed as a rights orientation dilemma, and the Sarah dilemma, which was constructed as a responsibility orientation dilemma. It appears, then, that the standardization assumed to be inherent in hypothetical dilemmas is an illusion and current methodology needs to be re-assessed. In addition, these patterns in the data further indicate that allowing subjects to construct the moral problem they perceive in a situation, which is most readily done through the use of self-generated, real-life dilemmas, is central to identifying the different conceptions of morality.

Theoretically, support for the use of real-life dilemmas is to be found in the structural-developmental assumption which underlies this research; i.e., that moral knowledge is constructed by people through their own experience. If one accepts that real-life dilemmas, in contrast to hypothetical dilemmas, provide a more direct reflection of people's actual experience of resolving the conflicts which invariably arise in their social worlds, then the use of real-life dilemma data is clearly more consistent with that assumption. It follows, then, that the differences delineated in that data will provide the most accurate representation of the two orientations as they are understood and manifest in people's daily lives. This, in turn, suggests that the coding schemes developed from real-life dilemmas in this research will be more directly applicable to understanding experiences of moral conflict in educational settings, counseling, etc., as well as to coding a broader spectrum of data in moral development research, since the manuals are also not dilemma-specific.

However, given the extent of the knowledge that has been gained through the use of hypothetical dilemmas in previous moral development research, the considerable body of research which has found that people may think differently about real-life and hypothetical dilemmas (e.g., Piaget, 1932/65; Haan, 1975, 1978; Damon, 1977), and the evidence that a discrepancy between how one thinks about hypothetical in contrast to real-life dilemmas may indicate developmental transition (Belenky, 1978; Gilligan & Murphy, 1979; Gilligan & Belenky, 1980; Selman & Jaquette, 1978), the merit of the focus on real-life dilemmas demonstrated in this work is not seen to negate the continuing merit of the use of hypothetical dilemmas. The evidence that people construct moral problems differently in the two orientations, however, does indicate that if hypothetical dilemmas are used, the methodology should include a means for identifying how subjects themselves construct the moral problem. Some pilot testing and preliminary data analysis suggest that the standard, non-orientation-specific questions used in the real-life dilemmas may provide the means; i.e., they may also be useful with hypothetical dilemmas.

Research has just begun in which the format for the Heinz dilemma has been revised to include the subject's construction of the problem. In this pilot research, the standard form question, "Should Heinz steal the drug?", which normally follows the presentation of the dilemma,

has been replaced with the question, "What do you think is the problem in this situation?" Preliminary data analysis of pilot interviews suggests that the revised format does generate data revealing the different constructions of the moral problem in the two orientations as they are represented in the coding manuals. That revised interview format is currently being used in research being conducted under the sponsorship of FIPSE on "Education for Women's Development." A cursory analysis of that data confirms the findings in the pilot interviews.

If it can be more broadly demonstrated that a standardized set of follow-up questions can be used after the presentation of both real-life and hypothetical dilemmas, the collection of data that includes both hypothetical dilemmas representing moral problems as constructed in both modes, and self-generated, real-life dilemmas would be in order. The coding schemes developed for this project provide the instrumentation that would allow for a much more systematic comparison of these different types of dilemmas and their relationship to one another. This, in turn, could lead to an explanation of the inconsistent findings in the literature which has examined that relationship.

C. A New Model of Moral Development

This work has provided a framework for the generation of a new model of moral development that can include what appears to be central in the moral development of females and missing in our account of the moral development of males. While in the past measures of development have assumed that there is a single conception of morality and that moral development can thus be represented as a linear progression along which developmental differences can be aligned as higher or lower, this work indicates a need to conceptualize and trace development in terms of two different conceptions of self and two different conceptions of morality grounded in two different understandings of relationships.

The developmental patterns of the conception of morality as care, also described as a "responsibility" orientation to morality, have been broadly outlined by Gilligan and her colleagues. (See Gilligan, 1977, 1980, 1982, in press; Langdale & Gilligan, 1980; Langdale, 1980; Lyons, 1980). Kohlberg has identified a developmental pattern in the rights orientation. And developmental differences in both conceptions of self and conceptions of morality are suggested in Tables 8, 9, and 12 as well as in the differentiation between responses of children, adolescents, and adults in the coding manuals (Lyons, 1981a, 1981b). Thus while there is clearly evidence in this study that both conceptions of self and both conceptions of morality change over the life cycle, the task of identifying the nature of changing understandings of the self as connected and/or separate and morality as care and/or justice, their complex interrelationship, and the nature of their differential association with gender across the life cycle require

the systematic exploration of age and gender differences in large enough samples so that the logic of the developmental changes and the nature of their interrelationships can be derived from empirical data.

D. Theory Expansion

The most fundamental implication of this work may be for theory. The confirmation of the relationship between the two different modes of moral choice and the two different modes of self-definition--i.e., the relationship between a morality of care and the self as connected and the parallel relationship between a morality of justice and the self as separate--brings together the domains of ego psychology and moral psychology. While the results of this study do not allow us to say that there is a causal relationship between modes of self-definition and modes of moral choice, we can say that a significant relationship exists. Further, such an association suggests that self-definition as characterized here--i.e., as "separate/objective" or "connected"--may be an important theoretical construct for indicating clusters of significant relationships. For example, not only modes of moral choice but patterns of decision-making of all kinds may be related to these modes of self-definition. Thus, while we are aware that the size of this sample is limited, the relationship identified in these data and presented here seem potentially important both theoretically and practically. It may be, for example, not only our conceptual constructs such as "Identity," but the very way we think about all kinds of practical aspects of learning may be subject to revision. If these results hold over samples of a broader SES and larger populations, we would suggest that the construct of self-definition in relation to others presented in this work offers a new conceptualization of primary importance.

If the exclusion of women in the past obscured our understanding of the psychology of care, perhaps the inclusion of men and women in future studies will help reveal its complexity for both sexes, thus presenting a new base for theory construction.

VI. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Through the identification of the conception of morality as care and the related conception of self as connected identified in this research, this study contributes to education a different understanding of people's relationships to one another in two important ways: (1) to the notion of responsibility as duty, obligation or accountability identified in previous research, this work adds the understanding of responsibility as a response to others out of concern for their well-being; and (2) to the notion of a perspective toward others in terms of the self, this work adds the notion of a perspective toward others in their own terms. In so doing, this work makes several significant contributions to education--not only to the understanding of important problems of schools and of research practices employed in their solution, but also contributions to the day to day interactions of students and teachers. Although acknowledging that good research does not automatically improve education, it is possible to come closer to achieving that goal if we can be specific in suggesting implications we do see. In this context, we would suggest that this project makes important contributions to basic knowledge and research, educational practice, and equity by:

1. Offering the possibility of new conceptualizations of educational problems by pointing to the limitations of old assumptions and by suggesting the consideration of new ones, especially that responsibility in relationships may function differently in males and females and rests on premises different from and not defined solely by notions of duty and obligation;
2. Presenting a research model and findings that suggest that a consideration of male/female differences be built into future research designs to address significant educational problems and practices. This must be done if important human sex differences are to be understood in useful ways and if research is itself to be useful and sensitive in illuminating problems and practices;
3. Offering a more elaborated understanding of responsiveness in relationships as a new perspective for addressing long-standing and serious educational problems such as discipline, school organization and teacher-student interaction.
4. Presenting research findings that can help teachers and administrators better understand their students and deal in more productive and equitable ways in their interactions with them, which in turn confirm students in their own strengths and not their seeming vulnerabilities; and,
5. Providing educational practitioners with new knowledge and rationales for different kinds of educational practices which take into account how responsiveness in relationships can be recognized and fostered in children and adolescents.

It seems useful to elaborate these outcomes and to spell out the interconnections between them.

A. New Knowledge and Research: The Question of Basic Assumptions

In addressing educational problems, researchers and educators alike have floundered as frequently on inadequate conceptualizations of problems as they have on inadequate methodologies and practices. For conceptualizations of problems have been found to rest on assumptions that are usually untested or at best not made explicit (Argyris & Schon, 1974). And yet from assumptions follow plans, and procedures that inevitably produce patterns of human interactions and behaviors that tend to reinforce each other in a self-sustaining cycle that leave untouched the assumptions from which they spring. There may, for example, be little doubt that discipline remains a major national concern of parents and teachers. But it is also clear that solutions offered to schools rest largely on one assumption, that is, that interactions between people, especially their fractures, may best be adjudicated by rules and regulations. Increased mandates of state and federal law regarding the rights of students attest to this, as do prolific high school handbooks dominated by school rules. But recent research suggests the consideration of a different assumption, that is, that giving students opportunities for growth in being responsible in relationships may have a direct bearing not only on improving school discipline but on school achievement as well.

In their comprehensive study of twelve London high schools, schools characteristically similar in problems to their American counterparts, Michael Rutter (1980) and his colleagues found empirical confirmation of the significance of an assumption that has always informed the thinking of educators, that is, that human interactions and patterns of behavior between students and teachers make a difference in the life of a school and its students. While Rutter's work offers British and American educators hope that schools do make a difference, his identification of particular variables related to successful school outcomes suggests a re-examination of some old assumptions. Although cautious in his observation that conclusions about causality can only come from conducting further experimental studies, Rutter does suggest that it is a school's internal social life and processes that matter most to school outcomes. In addition to academic standards, intellectual balance in the mix of students in a school as well as comfortable facilities, Rutter identifies classroom strategies, rewards not punishments, and opportunities for participation and growth in responsibility to be directly related to successful outcomes. In contrast then, to an assumption that relationships require regulation by rules, Rutter's work suggests that relationships regulated through an understanding of responsiveness to one another may be more significant to student success.

This work, in providing a focus on a new assumption about the significance of responsiveness in relationships, offers to practitioners a tool for examining their own assumptions about what it is that shapes their policies and practices and a means to explore how a perspective on response ought to be balanced against a concern for rights. Similarly, this project, in addition to focussing on sex differences

and reporting significant sex differences in the understanding of relationships, suggests to other researchers of school practices and problems a new dimension to consider in their work. No longer can researchers assume that there are probably no sex differences at work in the problems they are investigating. Rather they must create designs which include this question and measures sensitive to its examination. Thus this project provides a case study both for researchers and practitioners of the necessity to question the assumptions which inform the framing and study of problems important to schools and the practices suggested for their solution.

B. Educational Practice

Echoing the themes generated by his British research colleagues, Michael Timpane (1980) recently reviewed American research efforts on effective school practices. Noting that research of the past decade confirms the findings of the British, that is, that the school itself is the effective unit of educational improvement, he notes that what is crucially important is what the school does irrespective of interventions or amounts of resources available. Observing too that American researchers confirm several themes identified by the British team, he goes on to decry a sea of correlations that still leave problemmatic determining how best to foster effective schooling.

In suggesting implications for educational practices, this project acknowledges with Timpane the reality of risks involved in suggesting courses of action which may not be sufficient to the complex set of interactions that go on in the human institutions we call schools. But given the confirmation found in the British study and the fact that differences in understanding relationships have only now been discovered by exploring sex differences, and given, too, that American psychological research has been biased in its use of models based on the life experiences of men calling into question previous research directed to school practices that affect females, we suggest that attention to considerations of fostering the growth of responsiveness in relationships must be given serious consideration by educators who seek effective schools.

One particular area that deserves attention is that of discipline. The differential association of the morality of care and the concomitant understanding of responsiveness in relationships with gender found in this study parallels a differential association of school discipline problems with gender (Anastasi, 1980). Given: (1) that both conceptions of morality and school discipline function to enable people to live coherently with one another, and (2) that the central concern within the morality of care is the well-being of others, it seems plausible to hypothesize a relationship between discipline and the morality of care. If a relationship between the absence of a morality of care and discipline problems were found to exist, the clearer understanding of responsiveness delineated in this research could

lead to a new conceptualization of the very old problem of discipline. If the relationship between gender and conception of morality is confirmed in broader samples, this work could then lead not only to the recognition of the central concerns of female students who, previously labeled as having a less-developed sense of justice have been seen and have seen themselves as somehow inadequate, but also the exploration of ways that the male students, who are consistently identified as the primary discipline problems, may be given further opportunities to develop their understanding of responsiveness and care. The findings of this research that the morality of care appeared more predominantly in the male life cycle at adolescence points to this potential. While this remains speculative, the recurring identification of discipline as the major problem in the schools (reflected annually in the Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitude Toward the Schools) and the absence of the concern with the well-being of others (reflected in the widely-reported increase in violence and vandalism in the schools) make it clear that new approaches to these central moral problems in the schools are sorely needed. The central concerns of a morality of care appear to offer a viable approach.

To recognize that educators have always acknowledged the inherently social nature of learning and the importance of human interaction in creating good schools, we need only think of efforts that are undertaken to foster relationships among children in elementary school, efforts to change school structures that high schools have experimented with over the last twenty years, and allow students to be more responsible for their own lives and learning. This work in identifying different ways in which the social experience of relationships is understood, suggests that we should encourage students to be concerned about the lives and learning of others as well.

In a more general sense, the morality of care points to implications for the curriculum in our schools. The focus on the particularities of a situation and an understanding of others which mark the morality of care suggest a more narrative mode of thinking and a more contextual way of knowing. This points to a renewed emphasis on the communication and understanding that comes through the activity of writing, the reading of fictional and historical accounts of human society and lives, the demonstration through art of how meaning depends on context, the dialogue of classroom discussion, the construction of meaning in the interaction with texts--all aspects of education which have yielded over the past decades to the fascination with the abstraction of truth from life, and subordination of relationships to rules, and the increasingly impersonal technology of education.

To summarize, then, this work offers to educators:

1. A framework to assess the appropriateness of programs and practices to foster responsiveness in relationships;
2. A framework for understanding differences in the thinking of males and females about issues of moral conflict and

choice and the real-life moral dilemmas they face within the schools, at home, and in the community;

3. A framework for formulating new conceptions of recurring moral issues of central concern; and
4. A new rationale for the internal structures of schools or for developing new structures, curriculum, and patterns of interaction between students or between teachers and students.

C. Equity

Finally, this project in its systematic presentation of the differences in two modes of moral choice and two modes of self-definition offers insights too into differences in how problems are construed and resolved and raises the critical question of how educators deal with differences in their students. If educators had better understandings of these dynamics, they might better understand how to interact with their students and how their students seek to interact with them, thus dissolving some barriers between the perceived and important and real differences in individuals.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Through the inclusion of females in moral development research, we have identified what has been missing in our account of the moral thought and experience of both males and females. What has been missing is a representation of what we have termed the morality of response and care and the connected self which call attention to the reality of interdependence in the lives of all human beings. In calling attention to this aspect of human relationships, this research indicates that the story of human development has been only half-told.

The roots of psychological development are consistently seen to lie in the universal experience of the parent/child relationship. In the psychology of moral development, the focus has been on that aspect of the parent/child relationship which identifies the inherent inequality in ability, skills, knowledge, experience, status and power between parent and child. Based on that conception of the parent/child relationship, the story of human development in general and moral development in particular has been told as the story of separation. In moral development, the story first separates parent from child, then self from society. The story centers around the dissolution of that inherent inequality through a changing understanding of rules where the hierarchy of power relationships in the family dissolves as differences are overridden by systems of rules which grant every person equal respect. The moral ideal of equality thus dissolves the inequality of power relationships in the family and in society. But in its vision of the mature moral agent, freed from the domination of both parents and society and autonomous in his moral judgment, the relationship itself is dissolved, and he is left standing alone, tied only tenuously to others in the social world through the abstract understanding of the principles of justice which mediate reciprocal relationships.

This research points to a second aspect of the parent/child relationship, one which Piaget distinguishes from the relationship of constraint inherent in the differences in power between parent and child which he identifies as the root of the conception of morality as justice. Piaget describes this different aspect of the parent/child relationship as "a spontaneous mutual affection which from the first prompts the child to acts of generosity, and even of self-sacrifice, to very touching demonstrations which are in no way prescribed" (1932/65, p. 195). In his recognition of the child's capacity to enhance the well-being of the parent as well as the parent's capacity to enhance the well-being of the child, Piaget not only points to the fact of interdependence in human relationships, but identifies that interdependence as the origin of a conception of morality that is distinct from the conception of morality as justice. Piaget chose not to delineate the characteristics of this other conception of morality in his own efforts to lay the foundations upon which a psychology of moral development could be built. This work brings back to the field a focus on that neglected aspect of

the parent/child relationship by identifying that other conception of morality and describing its characteristics through its representation in the morality of care and the connected self.

Rooted in the interdependence inherent in the parent/child relationship, the story of moral development told through a focus on care and responsiveness is a story of continuing connection, first a story of connection between parent and child, then a story of connection between all human beings. In place of the image of hierarchy, we find the image of a network, conveying a different vision of connection, a different perception of the relationship between others and the self. The story of human development as an expansion in the network of relationships centers on the building and sustaining of that network through the responsiveness of people to one another--a responsiveness that requires a kind of vigilance to perceiving the particular needs of others in terms of their own particular situations and life histories, a responsiveness that reflects a moral ideal of care, where everyone would be responded to and included, and no one would be left alone, or hurt.

The psychological importance of connection has long been recognized in the psychological literature. Yet because psychological growth has been equated with separation, connection consistently has been represented as an impediment to growth. The centrality of connection to people's understanding of both themselves and morality identified through this research requires that we shift our focus toward the goal of understanding how both separation and connection, both justice and care, are intertwined in the social experience of all individuals and in their resolutions of the conflicts that invariably arise in their relationships with one another as they grow from childhood through adulthood.

APPENDIX A

SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL JUDGMENT USING KOHLBERG'S SCORING SYSTEM*

This research was formulated on the premise that there are sex differences in moral judgment. Since this is not an undisputed claim, the first order of business in this project was to replicate the previously reported sex difference finding using the standard Kohlberg scoring system in a more rigorous way. The complexity of some of the issues involved are summarized by Gibbs, Erikson & Berkowitz (1978):

> Is there a systematic sex difference in level (specifically, Kohlberg stage level) of moral judgment? The results of some studies (e.g., Haan, Block, & Smith, 1968; Holstein, 1976) suggest that there is, yet other studies (e.g., Keasy, 1972; Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975) find no difference. As Rest (1979) notes, methodological difficulties have hampered resolution of this question. Before one can conclude that a sex difference does exist, one must have controlled for subject (e.g., age, SES), task (e.g., interview form), assessment (e.g., specific scoring procedure) and time-of-measurement variables (e.g., cross sectional or longitudinal designs) . . . Furthermore, comparisons across studies in this area have been hampered not only by these factors but also by considerable task and assessment variations due to differences in the version of the Kohlberg instrument and scoring procedures used. In short, the question of whether sex differences in moral judgment do exist requires controlled study. (Gibbs, Erickson, and Berkowitz, 1978)

The current research can be viewed as an attempt to address all of these questions within a controlled study of the cross sectional (CS) sample of eight males and eight females at nine age groups from 6-60+ (N = 144) which was originally intended for this grant. As has already been noted, in the cross sectional sample an attempt was made to select males and females of equivalent educational and occupational achievement. Since a two-factor index of socio-economic status (based on Hollingshead, 1965) based on subjects' education and occupation was available for each subject, this assumption could be tested. Three-way analysis of variance of the SES scores by age

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*A review of the original analysis of sex differences using Kohlberg's scoring system submitted as part of the Interim Report for this project raised a question of the appropriateness of one of the statistical tests used in that analysis. The re-analysis of that data using a more appropriate test is reported here. The analysis was done by Michael Murphy, a research assistant on this project.

group, by sex, and by subsample showed no significant differences between the sexes.

Except in the oldest age group (60+)*, all subjects were given the same two standard Kohlberg Form A moral dilemmas (the third was omitted to save time and scoring expense). The same scoring procedures were followed with all subjects, with scorers using Kohlberg's recently revised scoring manual and blind to any identifying information. The cross sectional sample was coded during the fall of 1979 by one of Kohlberg's most experienced coders. Coding procedures for males and females were identical. The current study can therefore be considered to be the kind of "controlled study" called for by Gibbs, Erickson, and Berkowitz (1978).

Although they ultimately support the finding of sex differences, the findings of the current research also reflect the complexity of the methodological issues involved. In the adults in this sample (i.e., ages 22, 27, 36, 46), men's standard Kohlberg moral maturity scores were higher than women's (CS = 413 M, 400 F). Males were also different from females in most of the individual age groups studied, generally averaging .05-.50 of a stage higher. Although this difference in group means is not statistically significant, it is in the same direction as found by other investigators (Berkowitz, Gibbs, Broughton, 1979; Holstein, 1976; Whitla, 1979) who have studied late adolescent and adult populations. Since statistical significance depends so heavily on sample size (Carver, 1978), it is interesting to note that in Whitla's study where the sample was relatively large (N = 362) the sex difference was statistically significant overall, but not within some of the sub-sample comparisons. Since the sample used in the current research is relatively small, it is not surprising that the results did not reach significance.

Another reason for the failure to obtain statistical significance may have to do with the unit of analysis used in the above comparisons--each subject's "moral maturity score"--which is essentially the average stage of usage over all dilemmas for each subject. The measurement unit actually used by coders is full or half stage points (3, 3/4, 4, etc.) that coders award to moral judgments made by subjects which match judgments listed in the standard scoring manuals. If it is to be considered as completely answered, each moral dilemma is set up to require at least one judgment about two conflicting moral principles (e.g., life vs. law in the Heinz dilemma). However, some subjects make more than one judgment on each issue. The average number of judgments scored per subject (hereafter referred to as points) in the CS sample was 4.18 per subject (for two dilemmas/four issues).

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*Because this section of the interview was not complete for all of the older subjects (60+), that group of 16 was dropped from the sample for the purpose of this analysis.

If, as some critics (e.g., Gilligan, 1977; Holstein, 1976) have claimed, in males and females of equal moral development, there is a general tendency for women to focus more on the concrete aspects of interpersonal responsibilities represented in Kohlberg's Stage 3 while men are more likely to be concerned with societal rules and abstract rights represented in Kohlberg's Stages 4 and 5, then one would predict that even in samples of men and women who were of equal ability, there would be a tendency for women's scores to show a distribution skewed toward Stage 3 and away from Stages 4/5 and 5.

To continue this line of reasoning one step further, if the majority of points awarded for both sexes fell at an intermediate level (e.g., Stage 4), it is quite possible that the averaging done of the points awarded to each subject to arrive at the moral maturity score could do a great deal to obscure the differences in the distributions of points awarded to men and women. A form of analysis which preserved the fine distinctions in scoring possible at the level of the unit of analysis (i.e., the "point" or "Criterion Judgment") would thus be a more appropriate form of analysis than the analysis of variance using moral maturity scores--since the latter is based on averaging.

On the other hand, using the scorers' points as the unit of analysis, it is possible to compare the distribution of points across all of the stage and half-stage step categories that are employed. All of the adults (ages 22, 27, 36 and 46) in the current samples fell within the Stage 3-5 range. All of the points awarded to these subjects were therefore either 3, 3/4, 4, 4/5, or 5. By summing the number of points of each type awarded to all of the adult males and and all of the adult females it is possible to compare the distributions of points for the two sexes. These point distributions for the 32 CS sample male and 32 CS sample female adults are presented in Figure 1. Based on an almost equal total number of points (128 M vs. 116 F), men receive more points than women at Stages 5 and 4/5, while women receive more points at stages 3, 3/4, and 4.

Finding a statistic to test the significance of this observed difference at the level of the unit of analysis has proved difficult. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample test seems ideally suited to a test of the difference between two sample distributions (and would be significant), it is not clear whether the use of the test in this sample would meet the requirement of that test that the units of analysis be independent observations. Although the Kohlberg scoring procedures require coders to assign a stage value to each moral judgment in a given subject's protocol independently of the other points awarded in that interview, it is also true that each point is awarded in full knowledge of the others that have preceded it in the interview--and that therefore these points are not actually independent. Since the nonparametric tests are generally set up with persons as the unit of analysis, the only analytic strategy that seemed able to both meet the requirements of the tests and also to maintain fidelity to the units of measurement

FIGURE 1. SEX DIFFERENCES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POINTS AT EACH MORAL STAGE: 32 ADULT MALES AND 32 ADULT FEMALES



(points awarded at a given stage) was a contingency analysis of the number of persons scoring at a given stage or group of stages.

In keeping with the hypothesis of the original Gilligan and Murphy (1977) grant proposal that it is the post conventional level of Kohlberg's theory which is the most problematic in terms of its representation of the perspective of women, the comparison chosen was presence or absence of any post conventional reasoning--any points at stage 4/5 or 5--in the adults in the sample (32 males and 32 females at each of the ages 22, 27, 36 and 46). A chi square analysis shows that the difference between adult males and females being scored at the post conventional level is significant at the .02 level (see Figure 2). Thus in replicating under well-controlled conditions the previously reported sex difference favoring men in Kohlberg's standard of moral maturity, the current research supports critics of Kohlberg's theory who claim that particularly at the post conventional level, that theory reflects a limited, western male perspective and may therefore be biased against women and other groups whose moral perspectives are somewhat different. The fact that women in this sample were educationally and occupationally equal to the men calls into question previously offered explanations (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Gibbs, Erickson and Berkowitz, 1978) for such a sex difference using Kohlberg's scoring system.

As a result of the completion of this project, however, the question of sex differences using Kohlberg's scoring system is cast in a different light in terms of an equitable representation of the perspective of males and females in moral development theory. This work has now identified and established a reliable system for coding both the conception of morality as justice represented in Kohlberg's scoring system and a second conception of morality--the conception of morality as care--which is not represented in Kohlberg's theory or coding scheme. Kohlberg's system was derived from a study of only males. The second conception of morality as care was delineated in this work through the inclusion of females in theory-building research and the coding schemes for both conceptions of morality were generated from data for both males and females. Thus the issue of sex differences in moral judgment can now be examined in an equitable manner which includes the perspectives of both males and females. While within the sample used in this research the two different conceptions of morality were found to be significantly gender-related ($p < .001$), they were not gender specific. Given the small size of this sample (N=36), it is clear that research on larger samples needs to be done to address the issue of sex differences in moral judgment. The significance of this work is that it has provided not only a broader formulation of the problem but also the instrumentation that will allow the necessary research to be done.

FIGURE 2. A COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL AND POST CONVENTIONAL MORAL JUDGMENTS IN MALES AND FEMALES

	Males	Females	
Conventional (no points at 4/5 or 5)	20	10	(30)
Post conventional (any points at 4/5 or 5)	12	22	(34)
	(32)	(32)	(64)

$x^2 = 6.39^*$ x^2, 1 df, = 5. $p < .025$

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